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Less cognitive conflict does not imply choice of the default option:
Commentary on Kieslich and Hilbig (2014)
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Abstract
Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) employ a mouse-tracking technique to measure decision conflict in social dilemmas. They report
that defectors exhibit more conflict than do cooperators. They infer that cooperation thus is the reflexive, default behavior. We
argue, however, that their analysis fails to discriminate between reflexive versus cognitively controlled behavioral responses.
This is because cognitive conflict can emanate from resisting impulse successfully—or unsuccessfully.
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Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) use mouse-tracking to mea-
sure cognitive conflict in three different economic games—
the prisoner’s dilemma, the chicken game, and the stag hunt
game—each characterized by a social dilemma. They re-
port that defection is associated with higher degrees of con-
flict than is cooperation, and they reason that this result is
consistent with their prediction that the reflexive, “default”
behavior is to cooperate.1 We argue, however, that their spe-
cific result—and their paradigm, more generally—fails to
discriminate between reflexive versus cognitively controlled
behavioral responses. This is because cognitive conflict can
emanate from resisting impulse successfully—or unsuccess-
fully.
Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) base their prediction on results
arising from a controversial research program by Rand and
colleagues (see e.g., Rand et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014).
The message in this program is succinctly conveyed in the
title of the first paper, “Spontaneous giving and calculated
greed” (Rand et al., 2012). However, as Kieslich and Hilbig
(2014) note, the empirical pattern is contested (e.g., Tinghög
et al., 2013; Lohse et al., 2014; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester,
2014), and a recent re-examination of Rand et al. (2012) and
Rand et al. (2014) reveals that the data sets contain no mean-
ingful evidence for the notion that giving is “spontaneous”
and greed “calculated” (Myrseth & Wollbrant, 2015). Ef-
forts to shed further light on the cognitive processes behind
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1We recognize that this particular use of the term “default” can be con-
fusing, as default behavior of course need not be inconsistent with a rea-
soned, controlled behavioral response. We use it here to mean the reflex-
ive, initial behavioral proclivity, in keeping with the terminology adopted
by Kieslich and Hilbig (2014).
the decision to defect or cooperate are thus well placed.
Adopting the stated assumption that cooperation repre-
sents the reflexive, default behavior, Kieslich and Hilbig
(2014) formulate the following prediction: cooperation
should be associated with less cognitive conflict than should
defection. Their line of reasoning is predicated on two tacit
assumptions: (1) efforts to resist behavioral impulse involve
more conflict than would no such efforts; and (2) efforts to
resist impulse are successful. The former is unproblematic,
but the latter is clearly not. Sometimes individuals succeed
at self-control; other times they fail. Thus, cognitive con-
flict may emanate both from the successful and unsuccess-
ful resistance to impulse. If we knew that conflict associated
with successful self-control were stronger than that associ-
ated with self-control failure, then we could derive the pre-
diction put forth by Kieslich and Hilbig (2014). However,
we do not know this, and the alternative possibility—that
unsuccessful resistance to impulse is associated with more
conflict—seems equally plausible. In that event, and on the
assumption that cooperation is the impulsive response, one
might predict that cooperation is associated with more cog-
nitive conflict.2 The authors’ prediction, therefore, does not
follow from their stated assumption; it might well be the
opposite.
That said, Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) add to the literature
by applying a measure of cognitive conflict hitherto not in-
troduced in the study of social dilemmas. And they find that
those who defect exhibit more conflict than do those who
cooperate. Might we work the other way, and deduce from
this which behavioral response—to defect or to cooperate—
represents the default? Unfortunately, we cannot. Observ-
ing that defectors exhibit more conflict could mean (a) that
cooperation is the default, and that successful self-control
2This prediction is contingent on the assumption that the difference in
conflict more than offsets the low levels of conflict exhibited by those indi-
viduals who, without resisting (see Figure 1), act on the impulse to cooper-
ate.
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Figure 1: The two-stage model of self-control. The individual either identifies conflict or not (Stage 1). In the event of no
identification, the individual exercises no restraint. In the event of identification, behavior depends on self-control strategies
(Stage 2).
Conflict experience; successful self-control; resisting impulse
ր
Identification −→ Stage 2
ր ց
Conflict experience; failed resistance; following impulseStage 1
ց
No identification −→ No conflict experience; no resistance; following impulse
entails more conflict than does unsuccessful self-control,
but it could also mean (b) that defection is the default, and
self-control failure entails more conflict than does success-
ful self-control. Neither possibility seems profoundly more
plausible than the other.
A visualization of possible interpretations of differences
in conflict might prove instructive. Myrseth and Fishbach
(2009) present a two-stage model of self-control (see Figure
1 for an adaptation), which distinguishes between identifica-
tion of self-control conflict, and the exercise of self-control.
This framework has recently been applied to the study of
pro-social behavior in economic games (e.g., Martinsson et
al., 2012; Kocher et al., 2013; Martinsson et al., 2014), and
it highlights when we would expect individuals to experi-
ence cognitive conflict. Crucially, when individuals fail to
identify a self-control conflict, they will experience none,
and will follow their impulse. However, they may also fol-
low their impulse after having seen the conflict but failed in
their efforts to resist. Hence, an observed behavior could be
the result of three distinct cognitive scenarios: (1) absence
of conflict identification, accompanied by no experience of
conflict; (2) conflict identification, conflict experience, and
successful self-control; or, (3) conflict identification, con-
flict experience, and failed resistance. Merely observing,
then, that one of two behaviors is associated with more con-
flict, does not allow us to determine which is driven by im-
pulse.
One might also consider whether the conclusions drawn
by Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) are justified by the moderator,
the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality
model (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Ashton et al., 2014). Unfortu-
nately, they are not. Again Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) base
their reasoning on an unnecessarily restrictive assumption:
“Dispositionally cooperative individuals should be partic-
ularly inclined to cooperate spontaneously and their deci-
sions should be characterized by particularly strong conflict
whenever they defect” (p. 513). How do we know that dis-
position here captures spontaneous inclination as opposed
to deliberative goal pursuit? Might it not be equally plau-
sible that dispositionally cooperative individuals are charac-
terized by the same spontaneous inclinations as others, but
differ in their deliberate pursuit of abstract goals? This sec-
ond interpretation would also allow for the pattern observed
by Kieslich and Hilbig, but it would change the meaning: we
might observe among dispositionally cooperative individu-
als a stronger difference in cognitive conflict between defec-
tors and cooperators because dispositionally cooperative in-
dividuals more likely would identify the self-control conflict
between cooperation and defection. Higher observed levels
of conflict associated with defection would then mean that
self-control failure involves more conflict than does success-
ful self-control.
Although Kieslich and Hilbig fail to discriminate between
default versus cognitively controlled behavioral responses,
they do provide evidence against four out of a total of six
possible cognitive scenarios. As illustrated in Table 1, there
might have been no difference in conflict between cooper-
ators and defectors, and cooperation could have been asso-
ciated with more conflict; the latter possibility could have
resulted from cooperation as the default and self-control
failure yielding more conflict than successful self-control,
or from defection as the default and successful self-control
yielding more conflict than self-control failure.3 As for as-
signing merit to the two possibilities that both involve higher
conflict associated with defection, we would have to deter-
mine how to interpret the moderator—whether it captures
dispositional spontaneous inclination or deliberative goal-
pursuit. If it captures the former, then we could conclude
that the default is to cooperate (among the dispositionally
cooperative) and that more conflict is associated with suc-
cessful self-control in efforts to defect. But if it measures the
latter, then we would conclude that the default is to defect,
and that more conflict is associated with failed resistance to
the impulse to defect.
We conclude that the predictions formulated by Kieslich
and Hilbig (2014) are premature, as is the inference that
their empirical results “support the idea that cooperation
is the spontaneous and less conflicting response in social
3Indeed, self-report measures of experienced conflict from Kocher et al.
(2013) and Martinsson et al. (2014) indicate that defectors in public good
games experience less conflict than do conditional cooperators, defined ac-
cording to the Fishbacher et al. (2001) taxonomy.
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Table 1: More conflict for cooperators than defectors can be observed for both defaults; yellow cells indicate viable in-
terpretations of empirical results from Kieslich and Hilbig (2014). First column indicates reasonable predictions on the
assumption that cooperation represents the majority default, but see Footnote 2 for a qualification for bottom row scenarios.
Conflict by cognitive scenario: Assumed majority default
Assumed self-control and its relation
to conflict
Cooperation Defection
No self-control No difference between Cooperators
and Defectors
No difference between Cooperators
and Defectors
More conflict with successful self-
control
More conflict for Defectors than for
Cooperators
More conflict for Cooperators than
for Defectors
More conflict with self-control failure More conflict for Cooperators than
for Defectors
More conflict for Defectors than for
Cooperators
dilemmas” (p. 519). While their results indeed have nar-
rowed the possibility set, they do not allow us to discrimi-
nate between the two possible reflexive, default behaviors.
Future research might clarify the meaning of cognitive con-
flict in economic games.
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